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Hungary to be perpetually invested by the officers of the town, the proceeds
of the fund to be used exclusively for the benefit of the poor at Christmas
time. The court had no confidence that the trust would -be faithfully ad-
ministered and ordered the executors to hold the sum pending further di-
rections.
In another New York case the Hungarian consul presented a certificate
asserting that the beneficiaries -would receive the property in question less
certain specific charges. The court declared that in normal times a consul's
certificate would be accepted, but that these are not normal times, and the
court ordered the property to be held in trust.'5
These cases illustrate the approach taken by the courts of other states
with similar legislation.
The new legislation fills a need, and it is well that we have recognized
this need. The happiest state of facts would be one in which the necessity
for this legislation did not exist, and all governments allowed persons to
receive and hold and enjoy property without confiscation and without
exorbitant penalties and taxes. But such is not the case today. Some per-
sons would reject the right of an individual to take property by succession,
and advocate that one's property should escheat to the state upon his death.
This theory has never been favored in the United States. The statute is
worded broadly enough to apply to any country where such conditions exist.
There remain questions which will have to be answered either -by judicial
decision or 'by additional legislation. But Ohio has taken a wise, firm step
forward.
ALFRED L. MARGOLIS
The Meaning of "Issue"
Issue is a simple word, but like many simple words it lends itself equally
well to different legal meanings. Thus in conveyances of both land and
personal property "to issue" the problem of designating those who are
actually entitled to share in the division of the property has frequently
arisen. Because the disposition of property often turns upon the definition
given this word it is vital that counsel in drafting any instrument in which
the word issue is used recognize the different interpretations placed upon
it by the various courts of this country. Failure to do this, as will be seen
later, could result in unnecessarily defeating the intent of a grantor or
testator. Moreover, since this word is so commonly used in statutes, wills
and deeds, it should have a definite and uniform meaning in any given
state. Such a definition can best be supplied by the legislature. It is the
purpose of this note to examine the various interpretations which have been
'In re Siegler's Will, 132 N.Y.S.2d 392, 284 App. Div. 436 (1954).
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given the word issue, either by statute or by judicial construction, and to ad-
vocate legislation which will bring Ohio into line with the better rule of
division when a gift is made "to issue."
According to the almost unanimous expressions of courts in the United
States the word issue unmodified by the context of a deed or a will is held
to designate the lineal offspring, in every degree, of the person to whose
issue the gift is made.' However, the determination of who are designated
by the word issue is only a small step in disposing of the problem. The
next and very controversial step is to determine whether distribution is to
be per stirpes or per capita.2
Under the influence of the English decisions most American jurisdic-
tions adopted the common law rule and construed a "gift to issue" to raise
a presumption that a per capita distribution was intended.4 Thus a gift
"to the issue of A" carried the property to all the descendants of A per
capita. This resulted in permitting descendants in every degree to take
equal shares in competition with their parents.
'Comstock v. Bridgeport Trust Co., 106 Conn. 514, 138 Ad. 440 (1927); Wyeth
v. Crane, 342 Ill. 545, 174 N.E. 871 (1931); Manning v. Manning, 229 Mass. 527,
118 N.E. 676 (1918); Jackson v. Jackson, 153 Mass. 374, 26 N.E. 1112 (1891);
Moon v. Hepford, 2 Ohio N.P. 365, 3 Ohio Dec. 508 (1895); Wistar v. Scott, 105
Pa. 200 (1884); Gest v. Way, 2 Whart. 445 (Pa 1837); R.I. Hospital Trust Co. v.
Bridgham, 42 RI. 161, 106 Ad. 149 (1919). For full collection of cases, see an-
notations 2 A.L.R. 930, 5 A.L.R. 195.
"Ter capita" is a term derived from the civil law. It denotes that method of divid-
ing an estate by which an equal share is given to each of a number of persons, all of
whom stand in equal degree to the decedent or donor without reference to their stocks
or the right of representation.
'Ter stirpes;' a term also derived from the civil law, denotes that method of di-
viding an estate in which a class or group of distributees take the share to which the
deceased would have been entided, taking thus by their right of representing such
ancestor, and not as so many individuals.
I The English courts adopted a per capita rule of construction for two reasons. The
first reason, which is of historical interest only, is found discussed in 5 A.L.R.
195. The second reason was that a bequest to the issue of a man was a bequest to a
class. All persons living at the time the bequest took effect, who were within the
designated class, took equally. If the word "issue" were to be given the limited
meaning of "children," then all the children living at that time would take per
capita, but children of deceased children, not being in the class, would take nothing.
If, however, the word "issue" was given the meaning of descendants of every degree,
then all that were within the designation of the class would share equally. As the
right did not come through the parent but to the grandchild directly as an original
object of the bequest, because of its being one of the class designated, the grandchild
would take per capita, and without regard to stock.
'The following language of Judge Andrews in Soper v. Brown, 136 N.Y. 244, 32
N.E. 768 (1892) has been often quoted by the courts: "It is settled that under a gift
to issue, where the word is used without any terms in the context to qualify its
meaning, the children of the ancestor and the issue of such children, although the
parent is living, as well as the issue of deceased children, take in equal shares per
capita and not per stirpes, as primary objects of the disposition."
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Because such a construction was often believed to reach an inequitable
result, bitter criticism was frequently expressed by judges who felt them-
selves bound by such a rule of division.5 The Rhode Island Supreme
Court once stated:6
It is apparent that courts generally have a strong feeling that, in di-
recting the distribution per capita of a gift to issue, they may be defeating
the real intention of the testator where such distribution will result in giv-
ing to issue of a more remote generation an equal share with those of a
nearer generation.
In a Tennessee case7 it was pointed out that the per capita rule has been
followed in this country only because courts "have continued a definition of
the word isszw which the courts of England adopted with reluctance."
As a result the courts have been astute to discover from the context of a
deed or will some "faint glimpse" of stirpital intention.8 The reasoning of
the courts seemingly proceeds in this manner: Standing alone, a gift "to
issue" will 'be given a certain meaning by the law, but this will be done only
in obedience to a presumed intent. If by the light reflected from other
provisions in the will or deed a different intent is discoverable, the reason
for the rule fails and a different, more desirable result is reached. 9
Thus, although some courts continued to give lip-service to the common
law rule, they so readily seized upon the slightest opportunity to interpret
certain words and phrases as indicating that a stirpital distribution was in-
tended by the donor or testator that the exception soon began to swallow
the general rule. Even more progressive courts have gone so far as to
reject the undesirable common law rule and have in its place adopted the
preferable rule of construction first expounded by the courts of Massachu-
setts.
The Massachusetts courts at an early date found a way to escape the
embarrassment endured by those judges who felt compelled to follow the
common law rule of division. This was accomplished.by adopting a stir-
pital rule of division. 10 Such a rule of construction permitted issue or
descendants of unequal degree of consanguinity to share together only when
5 See Perry v. Petry, 186 App. Div. 738, 175 N.Y.S. 30 (1919); Freeman v. Parsley,
3 Ves. Jr. 421 (1797).
'R.I. Hospital Trust Co. v. Bridgman, 42 R.I. 161, 106 Ad. 149 (1919).
'Lea v. Lea, 145 Tenn. 693, 237 S.W.2d 59 (1922).
'In re Child, 58 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1945). The generality of the word "issue" may be
reduced if the testator or grantor explains that he means something other than the
common law interpretation given this word, as, for instance, that he meant "chil-
dren" by the use of the word "issue" coupled with "father," or "mother" or "parent."
'See Hoppock v. Tucker, 59 N.Y. 202, 69 N.Y.S. 326 (1874).
"
0 Manning v. Manning, 229 Mass. 527, 118 N.E. 676 (1918). Jackson v. Jackson,
153 Mass. 374, 26 N.E. 1112 (1891); Dexter v. Inches, 147 Mass. 324, 17 N.E.
551 (1888).
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the ancestor or ancestors of those standing in remoter degree of relationship
were dead and then only to the extent that their immediate ancestor would
have taken. Thus in Massachusetts the courts construe a gift "to issue" in a
will or deed, where its meaning is unrestricted by the context, as raising a
presumption thaat a stirpital division is intended.
Believing this to 'be the more equitable rule many courts when faced
with this problem have chosen to follow the Massachusetts rule."l
Consequently, in 1932, after analyzing the gradual departure from the
common law rule, either by statute or by the giving of a stirpital judicial con-
struction to the word issue, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania established
for that commonwealth the rule that, where such word is unexplained in
the context of the instrument, children do not take concurrently or per
capita with their parents, but take per stirpes.'2  It is of interest to note
that, in so holding, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania departed radically
from an earlier decision 13 which had bound the courts of the common-
wealth to a per capita rule of construction in this situation.
So, too, by judicial decision Illinois has adopted the Massachusetts rule
of construction.14
In still other states, where the courts have felt themselves bound, under the
principle of stare decisis, to follow the less desirable common law rule, stat-
utes have been enacted to abolish the per capita rule of division. Thus in
1921, New York enacted the following statute to put into effect the Massa-
chusetts rule:
If a person dying after this section takes effect shall devise or bequeath
any present or future interest in real or personal property to the "issue"
of himself or another, such issue shall, if in equal degree of consanguinity
to their common ancestor, take per capita, but if in unequal degree, per
stirpes, unless a contrary intent is expressed in the will.
Ohio, however, has continued to adhere to the old common law pre-
sumption. As recently as 1954 the Cuyahoga County probate court held
that testator's great-grandchild should share equally in the distribution of
her estate with her grandchildren, even though the parents of the former
were still living.' 6 Numerous Ohio decisions were cited in support of the
rule adopted by the court.17  Cases from several other jurisdictions were
'The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Mayhew's estate, 307 Pa. 84, 160 Ad. 724
(1932), remarked that the only courts which it had found which still followed the
common law rule were those of New Jersey.
"In re Mayhew, 307 Pa. 84, 160 Ad. 724 (1932).
'Wistar v. Scott, 105 Pa. 200 (1884).
'Wyeth v. Crane, 342 Ill. 545, 174 N.E. 871 (1931).
25 N.Y. DncnEDNTr EsTATE LAW § 47 (a).
"The Cleveland Trust Co. v. Johnson, 126 N.E.2d 824 (1954).
' ochrel v. Robinson, 113 Ohio St. 526, 149 N.E. 871 (1925); Welles v. Pape,
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also cited in an attempt to show that Ohio followed the rule prevailing in a
majority of the states."8
Whether or not this is actually the majority rule today is questioned
by many authorities. 9 But regardless of the answer to this question, it is
more significant to note that Ohio's neighbors - Pennsylvania, Illinois,
and New York - all follow the Massachusetts rule. Because of the high
degree of inter-relationship among the citizens of these important indus-
trial states, it would be desirable to have the same rule of construction fol-
lowed in each state.
Certainly a stirpital rule of division is preferable. First, it is more in
accord with the theory upon which intestate succession statutes are framed.
When the will or deed is silent the descent statutes could quite properly
supply the rule of distribution. 20 Furthermore, it is believed by most judges
and writers who have had occasion to study the matter that a stirpital con-
struction most often accords with the settlor or donor's intention.21 In ad-
dition, the inherent fairness of such a rule of construction has appealed to
both the courts and the legislatures of many states.
For these reasons it is submitted that Ohio should adopt a stirpital rule
of construction in this situation.
Since the courts of this state have shown their reluctance to adopt the
Massachusetts rule the following statute is proposed to achieve this result:
MEANING OF "ISSUE" AND "DESCENDANTS" WHEN USED
IN CONVEYANCES BY WILL OR BY DEED.
Unless a different intention is expressed in the statute, will, or deed,
when the "issue" or "descendants," of a designated person, including a
grantor or testator, are referred to as a class in a statute or included among
or excluded as a class from the beneficiaries of a conveyance, either by will
or by deed, the word "issue" or "descendants" means:
(a) those persons who are the lawful lineal descendants of the desig-
nated person, except lineal descendants of living lineal descendants; and
(b) children adopted, persons designated as heirs, the persons legiti-
63 Ohio App. 432, 27 N.E.2d 169 (1940); Watson v. Watson, 34 Ohio App. 311,
171 N.E. 257 (1929).
'Northern Trust Co. v. Wheeler, 345 Ill. 182, 177 N.E. 884 (1931); Mazzoitte v.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 180 Md. 48, 23 A.2d 4 (1941); Schmidt v. Jewett, 195
N.Y. 486, 88 N.E. 1110 (1909); Ridley v. McPherson, 100 Tenn. 402, 43 S.W.
772 (1897). The court erroneously included New York among those states follow-
ing the common law view and in support cited a decision rendered by the court of
that state prior to New York's adoption of the Massachusetts rule by statutory en-
actment.
"See SIMES, FUTURE INTERESTS (1951); Annot. 13 A.L.R.2d 1023, 1048.
' See OHIO REV. CODE § 2105.06. This statute is based upon a stirpital theory of
distribution.
=See SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS 325 (1951) and the cases cited in footnotes 5
and 6.
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